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The separation of ownership and control is the main cause of agency problems. Performance-related com-
pensation contracts (pay for performance) can link executives’ personal interests with those of the corporation
and maximize the beneﬁts for both executives and shareholders. Pay for performance is thus considered one ofurnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of
ier B.V. All rights reserved.
com.cn (Y. Shen).
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1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The determination of reasonable compensation contracts thus constitutes
a core research subject in corporate governance, especially in the case of China. Such contracts also have a
considerable impact on the successful evolution and development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Accounting performance is often used to evaluate executive performance, largely because of the observabil-
ity and relatively high degree of correlation between accounting performance and managerial eﬀort (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986). Numerous studies have concentrated on the relationship between executive compensation
and performance (Murphy, 1985, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Those examining the rela-
tionship between executive compensation and the performance of China’s listed companies (Wei, 2000; Li,
2000; Liu et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2003; Du and Zhai, 2005; Du and Wang, 2007), however, have failed
to reach a consistent conclusion. The reason for the lack of consensus could be that, without exception these
studies were all based on the same implicit logical premise, that is, that attractive compensation should be
strongly related to corporate performance. However, such a premise omits the possible correlation between
performance and executive eﬀort. Is maximum accounting performance the only goal of the shareholders
of China’s listed ﬁrms? Does accounting performance reﬂect executive eﬀort and the degree of that eﬀort?
Is it possible that political targets limit the eﬀectiveness of accounting performance-based compensation con-
tracts among China’s listed companies? What kind of behavior do corporate executives exhibit to maximize
personal beneﬁts in the face of diﬀerent types of government intervention? All of these questions deserve
in-depth analysis and the search for their answers provides the motivation for the current study.
During China’s transition from a planned to a market economy, the decentralization of political power
increased the residual claims and control of the business operations of local government (including corpora-
tions). Such factors as employment, economic development, social stability, ﬁscal surplus, the loan orientation
of state-owned commercial banks, personal career promotion and rent-seeking opportunities all boosted the
desire of local governments to maintain inﬂuence over local enterprises (Chen, 2003). The appointment and
regulation of executives reﬂected local governments’ need to maintain the control rights of local SOEs and
the aim of such control was often to make these SOEs better serve these governments’ political objectives.
Lin and Li (2004) suggests that China’s SOEs bear the policy burdens of social functions, such as limiting
layoﬀs and boosting employee welfare. Regional employment, social harmony and stability remain the main
objectives of local government and constitute the promotion criteria for government oﬃcials. As a result, local
government oﬃcials try to boost employment by forcing local enterprises to limit layoﬀs and hire more per-
sonnel. However, as Boycko et al. (1996) point out, privatization has raised the cost of such government inter-
vention so high that the number of redundant, i.e., superﬂuous, employees is being reduced in private
corporations. Hence, SOEs have become a prime tool by which government attempts to achieve its political
goals. One of the results of government intervention has been an increase in redundant manpower in SOEs.
The less inﬂuence the market has, the more serious the degree of local protectionism and government inter-
vention (Fan and Wang, 2010). When subject to government intervention, SOEs face multiple objectives.
Accordingly, executive eﬀorts to meet political targets, such as boosting local employment to satisfy local gov-
ernment oﬃcials, will not be reﬂected in accounting performance. In addition, the accounting performance of
SOEs usually reﬂects the ﬁnancial subsidies given by the government as compensation for the policy-related
losses that stem from employing a surplus labor force and is thus not merely the result of executive eﬀort,
which reduces the inﬂuence of incentives. The existence of multiple endogenous targets for SOEs renders a
one-sided emphasis on compensation-related incentives for ﬁnancial performance inappropriate in many cases
(Xin et al., 2007). In other words, SOEs’ multiple objectives increase the cost of separating management eﬀort
and performance, which may reduce the eﬀectiveness of performance-based compensation contracts. This
paper starts from overemployment and explores whether the existence of a large number of redundant employ-
ees reduces the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) of state-owned listed companies. It further examines
whether executive compensation is sensitive to corporate performance and how the degree of market develop-
ment inﬂuences the future growth of employee numbers.
We ﬁnd the presence of surplus manpower signiﬁcantly reduces executive PPS. Firms with greater PPS sen-
sitivity have stronger motivation to control the growth of employee numbers in the future and the interaction
between a dummy variable for PPS and present surplus employees is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with
employee growth during time t + 1. In addition, compared with their counterparts in regions with a less
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future growth in employee numbers, with the interaction of market index and present surplus employment
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with employee growth during time t + 1.
The potential contributions of this paper are as follows. (1) The surplus employment caused by government
political intervention weakens our ability to evaluate executive eﬀort and this decrease in PPS increases agency
problems to a certain extent. (2) The ﬁndings of this study help us to better understand the role played by the
Chinese government in the economic transition process and help to deepen our understanding of the country’s
institutional background. (3) Assuming that managers have the motivation to maximize their own beneﬁts,
closely tying management compensation to corporate performance could serve to control the number of
superﬂuous employees, thereby conﬂicting with the political goals of local government, a ﬁnding that provides
a new perspective on the mutual interests of corporate executives and government oﬃcials and a fresh expla-
nation for the factors inﬂuencing employment in China.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature, including
that on the policy burden of SOEs, executive compensation and PPS. Section 3 covers China’s institutional
background, theoretical analysis and hypothesis development. Section 4 presents our research design, Section 5
descriptive statistics and Section 6 the results. Section 7 concludes the paper with a summary of our ﬁndings
and a discussion of the study’s limitations.
2. Literature review
2.1. The policy burden of SOEs
Both domestic and foreign scholars have carried out in-depth research on the policy burden of SOEs.
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) posit that the poor performance of these enterprises stems largely from government
oﬃcials’ attempts to achieve political goals through the SOEs under their control, for example, by imposing
objectives other than value-maximization, such as the hiring of more employees to win votes. Boycko et al.
(1996) and Bai et al. (2000) believe the key factor in the poor performance of SOEs is agency problems, with
government oﬃcials rather than executives in control and one of the main objectives of the former being to
improve employment ﬁgures. As long as government oﬃcials use SOEs to resolve employment problems, these
enterprises will suﬀer from overemployment. Donahue (1989) shows that, under the same conditions, public
corporations hire 20–30% more employees than private companies in the US Frydman et al. (1999) ﬁnd a
decrease in labor productivity to predict an increase in future unemployment among private companies,
but they ﬁnd no such relationship among SOEs, in which political pressure prevents layoﬀs. Dewenter and
Malatesta (2001) ﬁnd that workforce size, standardized by assets and sales, to be larger in public than private
companies and to decrease after privatization.
Researchers have engaged in in-depth research on the economic consequences of overemployment in China.
Lin and Tan (1999) and Li and Li (2004), for example, suggest that the existence of a “policy burden” stems
from a catch-up strategy that leads to investment in capital-intensive industries or industry sectors that lack
comparative advantages and provide fewer employment opportunities. China has an abundant labor force
and to mitigate unemployment the government asks SOEs to shoulder the social responsibility, i.e., policy bur-
den of hiring more employees regardless of actual need. Zeng and Chen (2006) ﬁnd that overemployment does
indeed exist in SOEs and that local SOEs have a greater policy burden than their centralized counterparts. Li
and Liang (1998) attribute the main cause of SOE losses to the continued employment of non-productive
employees, noting that SOEs do not engage in layoﬀ actions after suﬀering losses. Xu et al. (2005) ﬁnd the deci-
sion rights of SOE executives with regard to ﬁring to be signiﬁcantly associated with improved performance.
The ﬁndings of their study show the labor-related policy costs of SOEs to be particularly high and the decision
rights of SOE executives to be particularly important to SOE performance. Zeng and Chen (2006) consider the
economic consequences of overemployment, ﬁnding that the presence of superﬂuous employees and high sal-
aries together lead to high labor costs for SOEs. Xue and Bai (2008) demonstrate that the greater the size of the
surplus labor force in an SOE, the lower the average wage and the poorer the enterprise’s performance. They
also ﬁnd that SOEs in regions with a higher unemployment rate hire more employees surplus to their require-
ments and that the government gives more ﬁscal subsidies to SOEs with a larger excess workforce.
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the economic consequences thereof, very few studies have investigated the impact of political intervention-
based overemployment on executive incentives and responses to such employment. This gap in the literature
motivates this study.2.2. Executive pay-for-performance sensitivity
Jensen and Murphy (1990) is a classic study on PPS in US listed ﬁrms. They ﬁnd the PPS of these ﬁrms to
be too low, rendering executive incentives relatively weak. They suggest the constraints of public and private
political power as the main reason for the situation. Tosi et al. (2000) and Murphy (1985, 1999) subsequently
conducted additional research on PPS, ﬁnding company size, ordinary employees, unions, consumer groups,
and political pressure from Congress and the media to aﬀect the relationship between compensation and
performance.
Researchers investigating executive PPS in Chinese listed companies have drawn diﬀerent conclusions. For
example, Wei (2000), Li (2000) and Chen (2003) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant correlation between executive compensa-
tion and ﬁrm performance in these companies. However, more recent research has suggested a signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between the two (Zhang et al., 2003; Du and Zhai, 2005; Du and Wang, 2007; Xin and Tan, 2009). As
SOEs have multiple objectives, the higher authorities evaluate the managers of these enterprises not only on
the basis of ﬁrm performance, but also on their fulﬁllment of political objectives (Bai et al., 2006; Bai and Xu,
2005). Accordingly, some researchers have shifted their attention to the inﬂuence of administrative interven-
tion on executive PPS. Liu et al. (2007), for example, ﬁnd that the greater the government intervention in busi-
ness, the smaller the role of accounting measures in performance evaluation and the weaker the correlation
between accounting performance and managerial incentives. Xin and Tan (2009) propose the marketization
process, degree of industry protection, political background of executives and level of government control
as the key factors aﬀecting the eﬀectiveness of executive compensation contracts. Gu et al. (2010) ﬁnd that
stronger government control reduces PPS. Cao et al. (2010) report the cash ﬂow rights ownership of the ulti-
mate controller of SOEs to have a signiﬁcantly positive impact on executive compensation-accounting perfor-
mance sensitivity. Wang and Xiao (2011) suggest tunneling through connected transactions as one reason for
the decrease in PPS in China. In these more recent studies,1 the factors aﬀecting executive PPS are researched
at the system level, which is consistent with the overall theme of our research. However, we focus on the mul-
titasking nature of SOEs and propose overemployment as the medium by which government intervention
aﬀects PPS. Government intervention and the degree of marketization are relatively abstract concepts. Deter-
mining how and through what channels they aﬀect PPS requires further analysis. In this paper, we focus on the
speciﬁc impacts on an enterprise of government intervention or the degree of marketization, such as the man-
datory hiring of superﬂuous personnel, and analyze how they aﬀect executive PPS. Moreover, in contrast to
the prior literature, we consider overemployment as a variable reﬂecting a preference for government political
objectives.
As the PPS of an individual ﬁrm is diﬃcult to measure with accuracy, few studies have examined the eco-
nomic consequences of such sensitivity. Abowd (1990) employs a dummy variable for PPS and ﬁnds that if
current compensation is sensitive to performance, then executives are encouraged to work hard to improve
future performance. Here, we apply Abowd’s (1990) dummy variable method to examine the inﬂuence on
senior executive behavior of overemployment in enterprises with diﬀerent degrees of PPS.3. Institutional background, theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
3.1. Institutional background
Overemployment is associated with planned economies and is a characteristic of the SOEs operating in
these economies, which tend to operate a highly centralized employment system. The basic mode of operation1 We thank a reviewer for pointing us toward the latest literature.
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employees having any say in the matter. To maintain social stability, the government strictly limits layoﬀs
for economic reasons, thus transferring the policy burden of the social-welfare and ﬁnancial system from gov-
ernment to business. In the transition from a planned to a market economy, China’s employment system has
undergone gradual reform, from uniform distribution under the traditional planned economic system to a
market-oriented employment system that adapts to market requirements. However, the size of the workforce
in SOEs remains subject to government intervention for a number of reasons. First, the employees of SOEs
receive an income that in monetary terms is much less than the value of their labor, with an implicit contract
guaranteeing continued employment compensating for the low wages (Chen and Lu, 2003). Even if they oper-
ate a contract labor system, enterprises cannot freely terminate employees upon contract expiration or if their
positions become redundant. Second, corporate downsizing is also limited by a series of government policies.
For example, in 1992 an ordinance mandating the transformation of the operating mechanism of state-owned
industrial enterprises gave them the right to employ labor, but strictly limited their ability to engage in eco-
nomic layoﬀs. The Labor Law of 1994 states that “when the employer is undergoing a period of statutory con-
solidation before bankruptcy or is experiencing serious production and management diﬃculties and
downsizing is urgently needed,” it should provide “a report to the local labor administrative department con-
cerning its labor reduction program and including the views of the union or all employees, and listen to the
views of the labor administrative department.” Such language makes it clear that the ability of SOEs to reduce
their labor force is at the discretion of local government (Zeng, 2007).
More recent policies do allow SOEs to lay oﬀ staﬀ and increase eﬃciency, and accordingly, excess employ-
ment in these enterprises is gradually being reduced. However, the scale and speed of layoﬀs are still strictly
controlled by the government. Enterprises with good returns, even if they have surplus staﬀ, can rarely obtain
permission for layoﬀs. Their only option is to transfer surplus staﬀ within the enterprise (Chen and Lu, 2003).
Particularly since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, all levels of government have proposed restrictions on layoﬀs. For
example, in November 2008, the Chongqing State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) stated that layoﬀs would be strictly controlled in SOEs.2 In February 2009, the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, All-China Federation of Trade Unions and China Enterprise Confederation
jointly issued “Guidance on the Response to the Current Economic Situation andMaintain Stable Labor Rela-
tions,” which “takes the lead in [ensuring] no layoﬀs in state-owned enterprises.” It is clear that regardless of
changes in the employment system, the inevitable outcome of the government’s emphasis on maintaining a
large workforce in SOEs and restricting layoﬀs is overemployment. Before the reform of the SOE payment
structure, executive pay was not linked to corporate performance, but rather was based on a range of non-ﬁnan-
cial indicators, including the region in which the enterprise operated, industry sector, political level (central or
local), ﬁrm size and the job type and qualiﬁcations of the individual. Following SOE reform, SOEs in Shanghai
began to establish an annual salary system, in which managers’ salaries comprise a ﬁxed component (base sal-
ary) that was paid monthly and linked to the average salary of workers and a changeable component (risk com-
pensation) that was paid at the end of the year and is based on both the basic salary of corporate managers and
business performance for the year. Although these enterprises continued to have many non-ﬁnancial objectives,
they began to base their compensation on ﬁnancial indicators. Following the SASAC’s issuance of “Interim
Measures for the Performance Evaluation of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises” in 2003, in June
2004 it issued “Interim Measures for the Compensation Management of Persons in Charge of Central Enter-
prises.” The latter document stipulates that salaries in central enterprises consist of a base salary, performance
pay and long-term incentive pay, and proposes speciﬁc measures to link salaries to performance.
To maximize its own interests, the government has the motivation and ability to intervene in SOEs in a
number of respects. First, it has the incentive to carry out administrative interventions, such as mandating
employment and avoiding large-scale layoﬀs, as the regional employment situation is a key indicator by which
local government oﬃcials are assessed for promotion. Furthermore, a high unemployment rate and large-scale
layoﬀs are thought to bring crime, labor protests and other forms of social unrest, and social stability is2 According to a Chongqing Evening News report entitled “State-owned enterprises in Chongqing control layoﬀs strictly to ensure staﬀ
increase salary 10% in the year” (November 20, 2008).
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often highly sensitive to social stability. Hence, to maintain social stability, government oﬃcials have strong
incentives to force SOEs to hire excess labor and/or to prevent them from engaging in widespread layoﬀs dur-
ing the restructuring process (Xue and Bai, 2008). Second, control of SOEs still lies in the hands of govern-
ment oﬃcials, aﬀording the government the ability to intervene in these enterprises. For example, the
government still exerts substantial inﬂuence over access to key resources, such as approval for initial public
oﬀerings (IPOs) and equity ﬁnancing, and the appointment of SOE senior executives is still completely under
central or local government control (Liu, 2001). Therefore, the government still has the ability to force SOEs
to internalize its own goals. The foregoing analysis makes it clear that China’s SOEs are forced to bear the
policy burden of government-mandated overemployment. Because of regional diﬀerences in the promotion
of market-oriented reforms, however, local government actions diﬀer by region.
3.2. Hypothesis development
The reform of the executive compensation system has seen greater emphasis gradually placed on the rela-
tionship between such compensation and SOE performance, with the SOE sector gradually being introduced
to such market-oriented innovations as performance-based pay (Xin, 2007). Increasing the sensitivity of per-
formance to salary is considered an important way to resolve agency problems. If both the government as
principal and executives as agents pursue utility maximization, then we have reason to believe that the latter
will not act according to the interests of the former. Guaranteeing that the two have mutual interests and over-
coming the problem of moral hazard requires a proper contract that limits any deviation of the agent’s inter-
ests and behavior from those of the principal. In a situation of asymmetric information, the agent’s behavior is
unobservable by the principal, which can only see related variables decided by the agent’s actions and other
exogenous random factors. Hence, agency theory proposes performance-based compensation contracts, and
accordingly, a high degree of PPS may be an eﬀective contractual means of resolving agency problems. If
so, then what conditions should the performance measurement standards in these contracts meet? Banker
and Datar (1989) suggests that basic performance evaluation should be as sensitive as possible to a manager’s
actual actions, which should reﬂect ﬁrm performance as reﬂected in accounting measures. However, in the case
of China’s SOEs, government intervention can reduce the precision and accuracy of accounting-based mea-
sures of managerial eﬀort.
SOEs have a similar structure to government agencies and are responsible in large part for carrying out the
government’s political tasks. In the political promotion and evaluation system for local government oﬃcials,
political considerations such as the unemployment rate and regional stability play a vital role in addition to
such important economic indicators as gross domestic product (GDP), thus encouraging these oﬃcials to con-
sider SOEs an important tool by which to reduce unemployment and ensure stability (Shleifer and Vishny,
1994). As a result, SOEs are forced to retain more surplus labor than their counterparts in the private sector
(Zeng and Chen, 2006), which increases their operating costs and reduces management ﬂexibility and the
input–output ratio, meaning the executives of these ﬁrms often get half the results for twice the eﬀort. Given
the eﬀect of a largely redundant workforce, it is diﬃcult indeed for SOE executives to improve ﬁrm perfor-
mance through eﬀort alone (Bai et al., 2000; Xue and Bai, 2008). The issue of moral hazard may also be rel-
evant here, that is, the rational manager’s chosen production q is always less than optimal production q*,
which reduces the extent of his or her eﬀort. Because of information asymmetry, however, the government
cannot distinguish the losses that result from the policy burden it imposes on enterprises from those due to
managerial ineptitude or moral hazard. Hence, it is very diﬃcult for the government to penalize executives
for poor accounting performance.
It is interesting that despite the great policy burden that SOEs bear, we see few collapses or bankruptcies,
probably because these enterprises also play a game with the government, ﬁghting for or enjoying a policy
“yield.” At the same time the government plays the role of plunderer, it also oﬀers a helping hand (Calomiris
et al., 2010; Friedman et al., 2003). Given the policy burden the government places on SOEs for political gain,
it would not be in the government’s interest to allow these enterprises to collapse. Accordingly, it also adopts a
preferential policy toward SOEs. Xue and Bai (2008) ﬁnd, for example, that the government gives more ﬁnan-
cial subsidies to SOEs with a greater excess workforce. Lin’s (2004) research shows that when the policy
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ensure their survival, for example, by oﬀering them protection, ﬁnancial subsidies or a lower tax rate. Similar
to our discussion in the previous paragraph, because of information asymmetry, the government cannot know
whether an SOE’s good ﬁnancial performance is due to executive eﬀort or preferential treatment. Therefore,
we posit that accounting-based ﬁrm performance is less eﬀective in evaluating the performance of executives in
SOEs because of the presence of a largely redundant workforce. Our ﬁrst hypothesis is thus as follows.
H1. Overemployment reduces executive pay-for-performance sensitivity, all else being equal.
We now turn to a consideration of how rational executives deal with the necessity of maintaining a large
surplus workforce. Although implicit incentives exist in Chinese SOEs, such as on-the-job consumption and
political promotion opportunities, there are also strong incentives to maximize the monetary compensation of
top executives.3 As market reforms proceed and private enterprises develop more rapidly, SOEs will face
increased competition, meaning their political goals may by replaced by economic targets, and the government
may place greater weight on these targets in assessing executive performance. In the process, the government
may allow greater managerial discretion to boost enterprise eﬃciency (Xu et al., 2005).
Not all executive compensation in SOEs is insensitive to performance even when overemployment exists. If
management believes compensation to bear no relationship to performance, then it has no incentive to
improve performance. However, because executives’ eﬀort cannot be reﬂected in enterprise performance,
the government cannot judge whether moral hazard exists. The greater the size of an enterprise’s redundant
workforce, the more diﬃcult it is for the government to clearly distinguish executive eﬀort and performance
outputs and the more obvious the problems of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior become. Thus, to a
large extent, overemployment becomes an umbrella to shelter management laziness. If executive compensation
and ﬁrm performance are closely related, then executives’ desire to maximize self-interest will motive them to
work hard to improve performance. However, a high percentage of redundant positions in the workforce
dilutes executives’ input–output ratio. Hence, using their own discretionary power to control employment
numbers is the only choice open to executives whose interests are closely aligned with performance. When
large numbers of redundant staﬀ become a drag on the maximization of executive self-interest, it is impossible
to transform eﬀort into good performance. We thus propose hypothesis H2(a).
H2 (a). If executive compensation is sensitive to performance, then the greater the size of the surplus
workforce, the greater executives’ motivation to control future employment growth.
The decision to lay oﬀ redundant employees is not management’s alone, but also depends on government
plans. China’s economic reforms have led to diﬀerent local governments playing diﬀerent roles. Governments
in regions with a high degree of marketization may create a high-quality environment for enterprises through
institutional and technological innovation. In an attempt to reduce the burden on SOEs to absorb a large
number of surplus employees, service-oriented local governments may attempt to alleviate unemployment
in diﬀerent ways, such as by creating more jobs to absorb former SOE employees. Moreover, these govern-
ments are likely to give executives greater discretionary power in personnel matters. In this way, service-ori-
ented governments not only achieve the political goals of reducing unemployment and creating a stable social
environment, but also improve the economic eﬃciency of SOEs. Governments in regions with a low degree of
marketization, in contrast, are more likely to rely on SOEs to absorb the redundant workforce rather than
create new jobs.4 Government and management alike must adjust their behavior according to that of the other
side. Management usually wishes to lay oﬀ redundant employees to maximize its interests, but such behavior is
contrary to government objectives. This discussion leads to our ﬁnal hypothesis, H2(b).3 Although it is essential to give executives monetary incentives, such implicit incentives as on-the-job consumption and political
promotion opportunities inﬂuence the eﬀects of monetary incentives. Although they cannot take the place of monetary incentives, they
weaken their functions.
4 In Guangdong Province, where the marketization degree is high, for example, to bring in more talent and accelerate the ﬂow of talent,
the government forbids enterprises to hire redundant employees, especially since the ﬁnancial crisis (Chen, 2009). In Henan Province, in
contrast, where the degree of marketization is lower, the government has taken measures to stabilize employment and avoid large-scale
layoﬀs, such as reducing working hours and salaries and introducing job-sharing.
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a low degree of government intervention will tend to control the growth of employee numbers in the future.4. Research design
4.1. Data sources
Our ﬁnancial data and data on executive pay and employee numbers come primarily from the China Stock
Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) and China Center for Economic Research (CCER) databases. As
the CSMAR database began publishing employee numbers for listed companies only in 1999, we selected all
Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share companies for the 11-year period from 1999 to 2009 as our initial sample.
To ensure data quality, we gradually reduced the sample by (1) excluding ﬁnancial companies; (2) removing
companies that did not disclose information on their actual controller; (3) excluding companies whose trans-
action status was blank, ST or PT; (4) removing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and Growth Enterprise
Market (GEM) listed companies; (5) excluding companies whose ultimate controllers are privately held, for-
eign-owned or collectively held entities or unidentiﬁable; and (6) excluding observations with incomplete
ﬁnancial data or lacking data on executive pay or employee numbers. Following this process of deletions,
the study’s ﬁnal sample includes 7594 ﬁrm-year observations. Its regional distribution is shown in Table 1,
and industry and year distribution in Table 2.5
4.2. Model speciﬁcation and variable deﬁnitions
Model (1) is employed to test our ﬁrst hypothesis.5 Bec
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The model variables are deﬁned in Table 3.
We follow Du and Zhai (2005) and Xin et al. (2007) and take the natural logarithm of the total amount of
compensation paid to a company’s top three highest-paid senior managers as a proxy6 for executive pay. Cor-
porate performance is measured by the return on total assets (ROAs).7 In robustness tests, we also employ
such proﬁtability indicators as ROA (Net Proﬁt/End Total Assets), OROA (Operating Proﬁt/End Total
Assets), EBIT/End Total Assets and Total Proﬁt/End Total Assets because these indicators are the assessment
indicators8 adopted by the SASAC at all levels to evaluate the annual performance of SOE principals.ause the non-state enterprise sample for the extractive industry (B) and wood furniture industry (C2) is too small (<20),
ations from these industries are omitted.
ause equity incentive plans were implemented relatively late in China, it is not very common for the senior management of listed
nies to hold stock or stock options (Li, 2000; Wei, 2000), and hence this study examines executive compensation only in respect of
h component.
do not use market value or other market data as proxies for corporate performance, as China’s capital market development is still
itial stages and the price signal contains too much noise. It thus lacks reliability and comparability. In addition, Chinese enterprises,
larly SOEs, rarely consider a company’s market value in compensation contracts, rendering such value less important in research
issues surrounding compensation. Du and Wang (2007) ﬁnd executive compensation in listed companies to be weakly related to a
ny’s market value. Xin and Tan (2009) ﬁnd a stronger relationship between managerial compensation and the stock market returns
e-owned listed companies in regions with a more advanced degree of marketization, but the relationship between the two is still
ely weak.
r example, in 2005 Guangdong Province issued a “Notice of Interim Measures on Assessing the Performance of the Management of
wned Enterprise by the Guangdong Provincial Government,” in which it clearly stipulates that the basic indicators of annual
mance evaluation include the ﬁrm’s total net proﬁt, rate of ROE, gross proﬁt and net asset rate. In 2005, the SASAC of Jiangsu
ce promulgated “Interim Measures on the Assessment of the Annual and Three-year Term Performance of the Principals of
cial Enterprises in Jiangsu Province,” which stipulates that the basic indicators include annual gross proﬁt and net capital gains.
Table 1
Sample distribution by region.
Region 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sum %
Anhui 8 7 20 24 31 31 33 33 31 31 32 281 3.70
Beijing 9 13 48 57 62 70 70 65 68 70 73 605 7.97
Chongqing 7 8 16 16 14 12 16 16 19 16 16 156 2.05
Fujian 8 7 20 17 18 22 23 22 24 21 21 203 2.67
Gansu 6 4 12 15 12 13 15 13 9 7 8 114 1.50
Guangdong 31 24 75 84 80 87 83 75 76 77 70 762 10.03
Guangxi 5 3 15 17 15 16 15 12 15 13 14 140 1.84
Guizhou 3 4 7 9 9 10 12 12 13 10 10 99 1.30
Hainan 4 5 11 8 6 9 9 7 8 6 5 78 1.03
Hebei 6 6 16 18 22 21 23 23 23 20 17 195 2.57
Heilongjiang 11 10 17 18 19 20 18 18 14 15 13 173 2.28
Henan 2 3 13 16 17 21 23 24 18 17 17 171 2.25
Hubei 13 9 35 33 30 34 39 36 36 30 30 325 4.28
Hunan 9 10 22 23 24 24 33 29 32 27 28 261 3.44
Jiangsu 15 9 38 44 44 52 53 50 53 51 47 456 6.00
Jiangxi 4 3 14 15 22 22 22 24 21 19 17 183 2.41
Jilin 7 6 14 17 15 17 17 13 15 16 16 153 2.01
Liaoning 14 10 31 33 36 35 35 30 26 27 25 302 3.98
Neimenggu 6 4 11 12 10 11 11 12 8 9 10 104 1.37
Ningxia 3 3 8 8 8 10 9 7 5 7 7 75 0.99
Qinghai 3 4 4 4 6 5 5 4 3 4 5 47 0.62
Shandong 14 13 41 41 49 49 53 50 49 44 41 444 5.85
Shanghai 24 10 81 94 92 100 103 105 106 101 90 906 11.93
Shanxi 4 5 11 13 14 13 15 15 16 14 14 134 1.76
Shanxi1 5 6 15 16 18 14 16 16 14 12 12 144 1.90
Sichuan 24 20 35 33 27 34 33 35 33 30 28 332 4.37
Tianjin 5 5 13 19 19 16 19 16 17 19 18 166 2.19
Xinjiang 2 0 9 12 13 17 16 16 16 15 14 130 1.71
Xizang 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 13 0.17
Yunnan 8 8 15 13 14 17 17 13 13 12 13 143 1.88
Zhejiang 5 3 29 34 34 32 36 29 31 33 33 299 3.94
Total 265 222 697 765 782 836 874 821 813 774 745 7594 100.00
D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26 9Overemployment is measured as the diﬀerence between the actual number of employees (AL: the number of
employees per million yuan in assets, including serving and retired employees) and expectations of future
employee numbers. The non-state sector, which is less aﬀected by government policy burdens, is likely to cal-
culate its personnel needs in accordance with the laws of the market economy and hence to use the factors of
production (Chen and Lu, 2003). We take private enterprises as a reference for our estimate of the coeﬃcient
of superﬂuous employees to minimize estimation bias. When the amount of labor employed diverges from
proﬁt or value maximization goals, non-SOEs can independently adjust that amount. Therefore, in theory,
non-SOEs should have no superﬂuous personnel.
We ﬁrst regress the sample of non-SOEs by industry to obtain the parameters of our estimated industry
expectation employee scale model and then use the diﬀerence between the actual SOE employment scale
(AL) and the expectations-of-employee-numbers scale (Exp-L) as a proxy for the size of the redundant work-
force. According to the research of Zeng and Chen (2006), company size (AssetsSize), capital intensity
(FixedAssets), sales growth (SalesGrowth) and industry characteristics (Ind: China Securities Regulatory
Commission [CSRC] industry code classiﬁcations) are the most important factors in determining the size of
a company’s workforce. Based on these authors’ work, Xue (2008) employed these four factors combined with
asset growth (AssetsGrowth) to measure expectations of employee numbers. In the current study, we employ
Xue’s approach and estimate these expectations by industry on the basis of model (3) (see Table 3 for variable
deﬁnitions). Considering the diﬀerence between SOEs and private enterprises in the condition of ﬁxed assets
and personnel allocation, we add the variable of accumulated depreciation (Dep) to the four factors in the
model:
Table 2
Sample distribution by industry.
Industry 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sum %
Agriculture 3 6 18 19 20 18 18 18 21 18 18 177 2.33
Food 20 16 33 34 36 37 35 35 33 31 31 341 4.49
Textile Industry 11 7 31 34 27 29 29 24 24 22 19 257 3.38
Papermaking and Paper Products 9 7 15 19 15 17 16 14 13 12 12 149 1.96
Petroleum 39 31 93 99 97 102 98 95 95 82 82 913 12.02
Electronic 7 8 23 24 24 27 29 27 25 26 25 245 3.23
Metal Products 32 26 76 75 87 89 97 96 80 79 73 810 10.67
Machinery Manufacturing 31 31 110 116 122 137 141 135 134 126 122 1205 15.87
Medical 10 7 34 45 42 44 48 47 44 44 42 407 5.36
Other Manufacturing 3 1 6 8 7 9 8 8 7 6 7 70 0.92
Electric Power, Water 21 14 30 40 45 49 60 56 61 57 55 488 6.43
Construction 2 4 11 12 14 19 22 19 19 22 19 163 2.15
Transportation 10 10 31 33 39 51 50 52 54 55 50 435 5.73
Information Technology 4 5 32 38 41 44 57 40 41 41 40 383 5.04
Wholesale and Retail 31 19 66 66 62 60 61 57 56 52 51 581 7.65
Real Estate 8 7 21 26 34 36 33 30 37 35 35 302 3.98
Social Services 7 9 24 29 30 29 28 28 29 29 28 270 3.56
Broadcasting and Media 0 0 6 9 8 7 7 6 6 7 7 63 0.83
Others 17 14 38 39 32 32 37 34 34 29 29 335 4.41
Total 265 222 698 765 782 836 874 821 813 773 745 7594 100.00
Table 3
Variable deﬁnitions.
Name Deﬁnition
Lncomp Logarithm of sum of compensation of top three managers
ROA Net income deﬂated by total assets at the end of the year
EL Overemployment, as estimated by model (3)
Lagel Lag of EL
AL Ratio of the number of employees (included retired employees) to total assets at the end of the year
Num Logarithm of the number of employees
Lagnum Lag of Num
Pnum Growth in employment
Senti Dummy variable equaling 1 if pay is sensitive to performance and 0 otherwise
AssetsSize Logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
FixedAssets Ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets at the end of the year
SalesGrowth Growth in sales
AssetsGrowth Growth in total assets
Dep Ratio of depreciation to total assets at the end of the year
Market Marketization index of regions per year according to Fan and Wang (2010)
Nature Dummy variable equaling 1 if the company is controlled by the central government, and 0 otherwise
Layoﬀ Unemployment rate according to the NBSC
Lev Ratio of total debt to total assets at the end of the year
LargeHold Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder
Dual Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise
Mshare Percentage shareholding of management other than board directors
Rinde Ratio of independent directors to total members on the board
Pegdp Regional per capita GDP (in yuan 000)
Ind Industry dummies based on CSRC classiﬁcations
Year Year dummies
10 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26AL ¼ a1 þ a2 AssetsSizeþ a3 AssetsGrowthþ a4 SalesGrowthþ a5 FixedAssetsþ a6 Depþ e ð3Þ
As noted in Footnote 5, because the number of non-SOE observations in the extractive and wooden fur-
niture industries is too small, we also remove observations in these industries from the SOE sample. After esti-
mating the parameters of the expectations of employee numbers on the basis of model (3), we have the extent
Performance median 
Line 1 
Line 2 
performance 
salary 
B: both salary and performance 
below median 
C: salary above median and 
performance below median
A: both salary and performance 
above median
D: salary below median and 
performance above median 
Salary 
median 
Fig. 1. Deﬁnition of PPS.
D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26 11of overemployment in SOEs (EL), which equals the diﬀerence between the actual employee scale (AL) and
expected employee numbers.
Our measure of the degree of marketization (Market) is based on Fan and Wang’s (2010) annual regional
market indices: the larger the value, the higher the degree of marketization. As the market indices compiled by
Fan and Wang (2010) began only in 2007, we use the market indices for that year. The higher the level of
regional unemployment (Layoﬀ), the greater the pressure the government faces to solve local employment
problems and hence the stronger the motivation of the government administration to interfere in SOEs (Chen
et al., 2009). Accordingly, we expect the regional unemployment rate to be positively related to the size of the
redundant workforce.
Chen (2002) shows that local governments have stronger incentives to intervene in business and thus we
expect a negative relationship between the number of superﬂuous employees and the level of government con-
trolling the company (Nature). We hand-collect actual controller information for the 1999–2009 period and
then divide the data into central and local government control groups. In line with previous studies, we control
for ﬁrm size (Du and Zhai, 2005; Du and Wang, 2007), debt ratio (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Du and Wang,
2007), ownership concentration (Petronic and Saﬁeddine, 1999), aggregate number of those holding multiple
positions (Du and Zhai, 2005), proportion of independent directors (Westphal, 1996), per capita GDP (Li,
2000) and several other variables.
In model (2), we use a dummy variable for PPS. Because the PPS of each company is diﬃcult to quantify,
we follow Abowd (1990) and Chen et al. (2010) in employing a dummy variable to diﬀerentiate between high
and low sensitivity. The speciﬁc variables are deﬁned in Fig. 1.
Although, in theory, the sensitivity represented by line 1 is stronger than that represented by line 2, the slope
and intercept of the two straight lines cannot be measured accurately. Therefore, we can describe the sensitivity
only qualitatively through the use of dummy variables. Based on whether PPS is greater or less than the median,
we divide it into two groups and form four regions, namely, A, B, C and D. If executive (employee) pay and
company performance in period T in zones A and B are higher (lower) than the median of such pay and per-
formance, then we consider the salary to be sensitive (insensitive) to company performance.
The applicability and reliability of our main variable, PPS, are core issues in this paper. However, to render
the main body of the text and overall structure of the paper more readable, we relegate our discussion of the
related issues to Appendix A. In addition, another important variable is the surplus workforce, and the factors
aﬀecting the size of that workforce, such as the degree of marketization, may have some impact on this study.
For similar reasons to those mentioned above, we also discuss the relationship between the degree of mark-
etization and the number of superﬂuous employees and the reliability of our surplus employment estimation in
Appendix B.
5. Descriptive statistics
5.1. Main variables
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 4 show an uneven distribution of overemployment. The mean
of EL is higher than the median and the sample distribution is obviously skewed to the left. The distribution of
Table 4
Statistical summary of variables.
Variables N Min P25 Median P75 Max Mean Std
Lncomp 7594 9.16 12.39 13.13 13.73 16.53 13.03 1.00
ROA 7594 2.75 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.34 0.03 0.08
EL 7594 7.85 0.19 0.33 1.11 59.09 0.62 1.66
Lev 7594 0.01 0.36 0.50 0.62 2.56 0.49 0.19
LargeHold 7594 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.32 0.78 0.23 0.14
Dual 7594 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.90 0.30
Mshare 7594 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.01
Rinde 7594 0.00 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.67 0.29 0.13
Pegdp 7594 2545 10,323 16,999 33,151 78,989 23,735 17,967
Market 7594 1.14 7.18 8.47 9.46 10.65 8.24 1.62
Layoﬀ 7594 0.60 3.24 3.70 4.20 6.50 3.61 0.89
AL 7594 1.00 0.53 1.13 2.04 60.11 1.53 1.70
AssetsSize 7594 18.62 20.78 21.41 22.13 26.76 21.54 1.08
FixedAssets 7594 0.21 0.17 0.29 0.45 0.96 0.32 0.19
SalesGrowth 7594 1.00 0.01 0.14 0.32 149.08 0.27 2.63
AssetsGrowth 7594 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.75 0.06 0.06
Dep 7594 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.22 3.51 0.16 0.15
12 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26the other variables, in contrast, is relatively even, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between means and medians.
As the surplus employment scale diﬀers by year and region, we analyze its size in diﬀerent years and regions.
Table 5 provides a more detailed description of overemployment (EL) by year and industry.
If EL is greater than 0 then overemployment exists. In the time series in Table 5, the trend of such employ-
ment appears to be declining in both the mean and median. In terms of the median, the phenomenon of a
redundant workforce in SOEs is on the decline, especially since 2004. The probable reasons for this decline
are the progress of marketization, the deepening of state sector reforms and the weakening of multiple objec-
tives among SOEs, thus strengthening the ability of these enterprises’ managers to determine the size of the
labor force they employ. However, the number of superﬂuous employees in state-owned companies has been
on the rise since 2008, mostly likely because, following the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, the large amount of down-
sizing in private companies aﬀected the parameters of the employee estimation function. Because of the policy
burden placed upon it by the government, the state-owned sector was unable to engage in downsizing to any
signiﬁcant extent, but was rewarded with such measures as tax relief.
Table 6 presents the regional ranking results sorted by the median of overemployment (EL). Most of the
observations with large numbers of surplus employees are distributed in the western regions, such as Guizhou,
Hebei, Sichuan, Shanxi and Chongqing. These regions have a lower degree of marketization and thus are more
likely to experience government intervention in state-owned companies.
Table 7 presents a time series of the degree of marketization, executive compensation and enterprise
performance.
It can be seen from this table that executive compensation (Lncomp) has increased gradually in state-owned
listed companies over the sample period in terms of mean and median, with the mean (median) increasing
from approximately 122,000 yuan (88,000) in 1999 to 1.3 million yuan (990,000) in 2009. There is no obvious
trend in the mean or median in the descriptive statistics for enterprise performance (ROA) in diﬀerent years,
although Table 7 shows a rise in the degree of marketization (Market), which indicates a steady decline in the
degree of government intervention.5.2. Univariate analysis
We compare executive compensation with the number of superﬂuous employees. In terms of executive com-
pensation in the complete sample, the mean (median) for the low and high redundant employment groups is
13.102 (13.199) and 12.964 (13.037), respectively. The mean and median are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, indicating
that executive compensation is lower when the extent of overemployment is greater. In terms of enterprise
Table 5
Distribution of overemployment (1999–2009).
Year N Min P25 Median P75 Max Mean Std
1999 265 2.86 0.14 1.03 2.43 17.11 1.67 2.58
2000 222 2.27 0.06 0.76 1.98 19.96 1.32 2.28
2001 698 7.85 0.18 0.45 1.44 25.08 0.85 2.04
2002 765 4.73 0.19 0.44 1.32 20.83 0.78 1.86
2003 782 3.56 0.18 0.34 1.16 10.86 0.60 1.42
2004 836 3.32 0.18 0.28 1.02 6.98 0.51 1.23
2005 874 2.97 0.25 0.22 0.94 7.70 0.43 1.21
2006 821 3.26 0.21 0.26 0.97 10.22 0.48 1.26
2007 813 2.98 0.20 0.25 0.95 8.58 0.46 1.18
2008 773 3.45 0.20 0.29 0.93 8.23 0.45 1.15
2009 745 2.94 0.21 0.28 0.90 59.09 0.49 2.41
Table 6
Distribution of overemployment by region.
Region N Min P25 Median P75 Max Mean Std
Anhui 281 2.27 0.25 0.36 1.20 9.83 0.63 1.38
Beijing 605 7.85 0.51 0.09 0.98 8.40 0.30 1.39
Chongqing 156 1.03 0.11 0.82 1.85 18.70 1.26 1.98
Fujian 203 2.15 0.15 0.26 0.74 3.80 0.38 0.95
Gansu 114 1.45 0.17 0.34 1.07 5.49 0.67 1.32
Guangdong 762 3.27 0.12 0.36 0.93 6.43 0.46 1.14
Guangxi 140 3.56 0.06 0.39 1.11 3.95 0.40 1.22
Guizhou 99 2.31 0.00 1.16 2.11 4.65 1.14 1.34
Hainan 78 1.24 0.36 0.11 0.32 5.54 0.25 1.19
Hebei 195 1.07 0.06 0.88 2.06 13.70 1.54 2.47
Heilongjiang 173 1.13 0.14 0.49 1.16 3.94 0.79 1.04
Henan 171 2.64 0.01 0.45 1.08 6.54 0.68 1.29
Hubei 325 1.71 0.13 0.37 1.68 10.86 0.89 1.61
Hunan 261 3.16 0.38 0.14 0.81 4.92 0.37 1.19
Jiangsu 456 2.86 0.32 0.12 0.66 6.38 0.30 0.89
Jiangxi 183 1.33 0.05 0.40 1.01 5.05 0.73 1.30
Jilin 153 1.19 0.10 0.46 0.83 4.65 0.61 0.93
Liaoning 302 2.27 0.01 0.50 1.45 13.11 0.85 1.45
Neimenggu 104 1.02 0.27 0.40 0.76 4.59 0.42 0.99
Ningxia 75 1.41 0.47 0.33 1.10 4.21 0.60 1.43
Qinghai 47 2.48 0.39 0.19 1.23 2.36 0.28 1.13
Shandong 444 3.29 0.08 0.54 1.25 8.76 0.72 1.30
Shanghai 906 4.54 0.29 0.15 0.89 59.09 0.55 2.38
Shanxi 134 1.62 0.03 0.69 1.26 3.87 0.65 1.04
Shanxi1 144 4.73 0.31 0.52 1.73 8.73 1.19 2.33
Sichuan 332 2.32 0.10 0.88 1.97 25.08 1.60 3.10
Tianjin 166 2.97 0.69 0.01 0.66 5.01 0.05 1.44
Xinjiang 130 3.26 0.67 0.02 0.57 5.67 0.14 1.42
Xizang 13 0.55 0.16 0.45 1.46 1.65 0.65 0.84
Yunnan 143 2.43 0.22 0.10 1.01 5.04 0.39 1.12
Zhejiang 299 3.45 0.30 0.05 0.55 4.99 0.24 1.02
D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26 13performance (ROA), the low overemployment group is higher than the high overemployment group, and both
the mean and median are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. See Table 8 for univariate analysis of the overemployment rate.5.3. Correlation analysis of the main variables
Table 9 shows the degree of marketization (Market) to be negatively correlated with overemployment (EL),
which supports our hypothesis. In addition, executive compensation (Lncomp) is positively correlated with
Table 7
Statistical summary of key variables.
Year N Market Index Management compensation (yuan 000) ROA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1999 265 6.33 6.9 12.23 8.78 0.047 0.052
2000 222 6.39 6.45 14.42 9.48 0.041 0.042
2001 698 6.54 6.55 29.16 21.16 0.022 0.032
2002 765 6.92 7.02 38.93 29.93 0.019 0.028
2003 782 7.50 7.52 51.21 39.06 0.021 0.027
2004 836 8.47 8.53 65.22 49.93 0.025 0.026
2005 874 8.96 9.13 67.05 52.13 0.014 0.023
2006 821 9.00 9.21 79.68 64.90 0.027 0.027
2007 813 9.20 9.32 105.63 81.40 0.040 0.036
2008 773 9.23 9.32 120.02 92.00 0.021 0.024
2009 745 9.18 9.32 127.75 99.00 0.023 0.028
Table 8
Univariate analysis of overemployment.
EL N Mean T Median Wilcoxon
Lncomp 0 3801 13.102 6.01*** 13.199 5.255***
1 3793 12.964 13.037
ROA 0 3801 0.028 3.33*** 0.030 3.603***
1 3793 0.021 0.027
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 9
Correlations.
Lncomp EL ROA Market
Lncomp 1 0.139*** 0.232*** 0.584***
EL 0.183*** 1 0.041*** 0.117***
ROA 0.168*** 0.065*** 1 0.026**
Market 0.576*** 0.111*** 0.029*** 1
Note: The top presents Spearman coeﬃcients and the bottom Pearson coeﬃcients.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
14 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26enterprise performance (ROA), indicating that the pay contracts of SOE executives have a certain motiva-
tional function.
6. Results
6.1. Hypothesis 1
We employ the following OLS regression model to test H1, with the results shown in Table 10.
Model (1):Lncomp ¼ a1 þ a2 ROAþ a3 ELþ a4 EL ROAþ a5 AssetsSizeþ a6 Levþ a7 Shr1 a8 Dual
þ a9 Mshareþ a10 Rindeþ a11 Pegdpþ a12
X
Indþ a13
X
Yearþ eRegression (1) in Table 10 shows that the regression coeﬃcient of the interaction variable ELROA is
0.159 and signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level. After controlling for the other variables in regression (2),
this coeﬃcient becomes 0.112 and remains signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, which indicates that the
presence of a surplus workforce leads to a reduction in the sensitivity of executive compensation to enterprise
D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26 15performance, a result consistent with H1. As both the policy burden placed on a company and a reduction in
its number of surplus employees may bring beneﬁts, it is diﬃcult for corporate performance to reﬂect the
degree of eﬀort exerted by executives. The performance index thus contains government behavior that is dif-
ﬁcult to separate out, increasing the amount of noise in evaluating managerial eﬀort. These factors diminish
the function of accounting-based performance in executive pay contracts. Hence, the existence of overemploy-
ment weakens the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise performance.
The coeﬃcient on ROA is 1.890 and the coeﬃcient on ELROA is 0.112. The economic signiﬁcance of
these results is as follows. If the diﬀerence in ROA between two companies is 10%, and EL equals 0, then
the diﬀerence in pay is e (0.10  1.890)  1 = 20.80%. After adding the standard deviation (r = 1.66) to EL,
the diﬀerence in ROA leads to a diﬀerence in pay. This diﬀerence is e [0.10  (1.890–0.113  1.66)]  1 =
18.53%. The 1.27% diﬀerence in pay suggests that the economic signiﬁcance of the sensitivity of executive
compensation to enterprise performance caused by overemployment is relatively weak.
Executive compensation increases with an increase in enterprise performance (ROA), the local economic
development level (Pegdp) and asset size (AssetsSize), although ownership concentration (LargeHold) is neg-
atively related to the executive compensation level. The implication of these ﬁndings is that a lower ownership
concentration can increase control capability and supervision motivation while reducing the issue of moral
hazard among executives.
6.2. Hypothesis 2
6.2.1. Hypothesis 2(a)
To test the eﬀect of PPS on the number of employees to be hired in the future, we employ the following OLS
regression model, with the results shown in Table 11.
Model (2):Pnumt ¼ a1 þ b1 lagelþ b2 sentiþ b3 senti  lagelþ b4 lagnumþ other control variables
Table 11 shows that in the regression in which pay is sensitive to performance, the coeﬃcient on Lagel is
0.338 and signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, which indicates that the number of employees hired in the
future will increase more slowly if a greater number of redundant employees were employed in the last term.
Hence, executives whose pay is sensitive to performance will be motivated to control hiring in the future to
improve ﬁrm performance. There are two possible explanations for the relationship between former overem-
ployment and slower-paced employee growth in the future. First, management is likely to lay oﬀ currently
redundant employees to improve production eﬃciency. The proportion of layoﬀs will be greater with a larger
surplus workforce. Second, controlling employee numbers in the future can help to control increases in labor
costs. The latter explanation may have negative implications for the future development of the company. In
companies in which executive compensation is not sensitive to performance, the number of redundant employ-
ees maintained in the last term is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the number of employees to be hired in the
future. However, the coeﬃcient on Lagel is 0.202, greater than that in the sample in which executive com-
pensation is sensitive to performance. The implication is that companies in which executive compensation is
sensitive to performance will reduce employee growth in the future. The regression intercept of the sensitive
sample is 4.956 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, whereas that of the insensitive sample is 1.540. Hence, it
is clear that after controlling for the other variables, future employee growth remains negative in the sensitive
sample, and this sample has a smaller regression intercept than its insensitive counterpart. These results are
largely consistent with our hypothesis.
In the complete sample regression, the interaction variable Senti  LagEL is not signiﬁcant, and the T value
is only 1.242, although the direction is in line with our expectations. In a subsequent robustness test using the
robustness inference of heteroskedasticity and the cluster regression method, we ﬁnd the regression coeﬃcient
on Senti  LagEL to be signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
6.2.2. Hypothesis 2(b)
To test the degree of government intervention and the inﬂuence of prior-period overemployment on perfor-
mance, we establish an interactive variable between the degree of marketization and the number of last-term
Table 10
Eﬀect of overemployment on pay for performance.
Variable (1) (2)
EL 0.106*** 0.039***
(15.70) (8.057)
ROA 2.159*** 1.890***
(14.88) (17.14)
ELROA 0.159*** 0.113***
(4.734) (4.959)
Layoﬀ 0.099***
(10.87)
Pegdp 0.082***
(15.11)
Lev 0.051
(1.019)
AssetsSize 0.262***
(30.11)
LargeHold 0.006***
(12.14)
Dual 0.025
(0.988)
Mshare 4.177***
(4.018)
Rinde 0.338***
(2.652)
Constant 13.046*** 6.649***
(1045) (37.07)
Year, Ind Controlled
Observations 7594 7594
R-squared 0.061 0.583
Notes: The dependent variable is executive compensation. The independent variables are ﬁrm perfor-
mance (ROA), and Senti is a dummy variable for PPS, Senti_ROA is the interaction of Senti and ROA,
Pedgp is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP, Lev is the ﬁrm leverage ratio, Assetsize is the natural
logarithm of total assets, Largehold is the share proportion of the largest shareholder, Dual is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the CEO and chairman of the board are the same person, and 0 otherwise,
Mshare is managerial ownership, and Rinde is the ratio of independent directors on the board.
Regression (1) is the OLS regression without controlling for the other variables and regression (2)
controls for the other variables.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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carry out regression analysis on the sample, the results of which are shown in Table 12.
As regression (1) in Table 12 shows, in the regression that does not include the interaction variable
M_Lagel, last-term overemployment is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with future employee growth, that
is, the greater the extent of overemployment in the prior period, the smaller the future increase in workforce
size. When the interaction variable M_Lagel is included, the regression coeﬃcient becomes 0.116, signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level. Hence, the greater the extent of marketization and the greater the number of superﬂuous
employees, the slower the growth in future employee numbers. Regions with a high degree of marketization
experience less government intervention and SOE executives have greater power to lay oﬀ redundant
employees. The coeﬃcient of Lagel on last-term redundant employment is 0.615. As the model is a nonlinear
equation, the inﬂuence (the mean of the marketization degree in 0.625–0.116* is 8.24) of Lagel on last-term
redundant employment is 0.341, which is still negative and means that if there is a one-unit increase in
the number of surplus employees in the previous period, there will be a 0.341-unit decrease in the number
of employees hired in the future. Relatively speaking, the redundant workforce variable has a great eﬀect
on the size of the future workforce.
Table 11
OLS regressions of future employment growth on pay for performance.
Sensitive sample Non-sensitive sample Total sample
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Lagel 0.338*** 0.202*** 0.225***
(3.947) (4.690) (3.207)
Senti 0.187
(1.384)
Senti_Lagel 0.102
(1.243)
Market 0.004 0.002 0.000
(0.045) (0.042) (0.007)
Num 0.498*** 0.452*** 0.479***
(4.074) (6.501) (6.008)
Layoﬀ 0.055 0.100* 0.005
(0.476) (1.688) (0.070)
Pegdp 0.057 0.131*** 0.086*
(0.803) (3.556) (1.912)
Lev 0.297 0.163 0.299
(0.513) (0.535) (0.814)
AssetsSize 0.099 0.229*** 0.028
(0.723) (3.033) (0.316)
LargeHold 0.009 0.001 0.006
(1.450) (0.228) (1.556)
Dual 0.099 0.146 0.001
(0.303) (0.847) (0.005)
Mshare 38.661*** 1.424 17.614**
(2.599) (0.237) (2.096)
Rinde 0.413 0.254 0.065
(0.338) (0.481) (0.0911)
Constant 4.956** 1.540 2.508
(1.983) (1.191) (1.595)
Year, Ind Controlled
Observations 3871 2662 6533
R-squared 0.017 0.028 0.015
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in employment, Pnum. The independent variables are the lag of
overemployment, Lagel. Senti is the sensitivity index for pay for performance, Senti_Lagel is the interaction of
Senti and Lagel, Market is the marketization index according to Fan and Wang (2010), Layoﬀ is the regional
unemployment rate, Pegdp is per capita regional GDP, Lev is ﬁrm leverage, AssetsSize is the logarithm of total
assets, LargeHold is the percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, Dual is a dummy that equals 1 if
the chairman and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise, Mshare is the percentage of management’s
shareholding, and Rinde is the ratio of independent directors on the board. Regression (1) is an OLS regression
using the sensitive sample, regression (2) uses the non-sensitive sample and regression (3) is the total sample.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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in the PPS sample to be 0.159, which is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. The inﬂuence of Lagel, last-term surplus
employment, on future employee increases (the mean of the marketization degree in 0.898–0.159* is 8.24) to
0.412, which suggests that if pay is sensitive to performance, then the presence of a redundant workforce has
an eﬀect size of 0.412 on the size of the employment increase in the future. In the non-PPS sample, in con-
trast, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is 0.057, which is small and signiﬁcant only at the 0.05 level. The
impact of last-term overemployment on the size of the future increase in employee numbers (0.228–
0.057  8.24) is 0.242, which is signiﬁcantly smaller than that in the PPS sample. Similar to the regression
in Table 11, in the PPS sample, the intercept is 5.810, signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, clearly lower than the inter-
cept of 1.235 in the non-PPS sample. These results are largely supportive of our hypothesis.
18 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26We also ran speciﬁcations with three-way interactions: marketization degree  sensitivity  last-term over-
employment. Because of the existence of strong collinearity, however, we failed to ﬁnd signiﬁcant results.
Combining the regression results in Tables 11 and 12 allows us to draw the following conclusions. If executive
compensation is sensitive to performance, and we assume that managers are driven by the self-interest max-
imization motivation, then management is more likely to lay oﬀ redundant employees or control the growth in
employee numbers to control labor costs and increase eﬃciency. The less government intervention there is, the
larger the degree of power management enjoys to lay oﬀ redundant employees and determine future employee
numbers.
6.3. Additional test: government-imposed policy burden and government gains
In this study, we assume that the existence of a government-imposed policy burden and government gains
decrease the eﬃcacy of using accounting performance to evaluate executives. However, the prerequisite forTable 12
OLS regressions of future employment on government intervention.
Total sample Total sample Sensitive sample Non-sensitive sample
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagel 0.282*** 0.615*** 0.898** 0.228
(5.294) (2.640) (2.351) (1.247)
Market 0.070 0.076 0.038
(1.210) (0.824) (0.815)
M_Lagel 0.116*** 0.159*** 0.057**
(3.955) (3.320) (2.422)
Num 0.478*** 0.535*** 0.563*** 0.487***
(6.006) (6.610) (4.555) (6.865)
Layoﬀ 0.008 0.047 0.099*
(0.111) (0.406) (1.664)
Pegdp 0.084** 0.080* 0.058 0.125***
(2.213) (1.784) (0.819) (3.381)
Lev 0.311 0.296 0.299 0.144
(0.846) (0.806) (0.517) (0.473)
AssetsSize 0.024 0.040 0.084 0.242***
(0.269) (0.449) (0.613) (3.196)
LargeHold 0.006 0.007* 0.011* 0.001
(1.538) (1.732) (1.704) (0.277)
Dual 0.012 0.005 0.073 0.157
(0.0603) (0.0255) (0.225) (0.909)
Mshare 17.600** 18.232** 39.153*** 1.050
(2.097) (2.171) (2.635) (0.175)
Rinde 0.094 0.338 0.879 0.176
(0.143) (0.473) (0.716) (0.333)
Constant 2.465 3.135** 5.810** 1.235
(1.620) (1.985) (2.315) (0.952)
Year, Ind Controlled
Observations 6533 6533 3871 2662
R-squared 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.030
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in employment, Pnum. The independent variables are the lag of overemployment, Lagel.
Market is the marketization index according to Fan and Wang (2010), Senti is the sensitivity index of pay for performance, M_Lagel is the
interaction of Market and Lagel, Layoﬀ is the regional unemployment rate, Pegdp is regional per capita GDP, Lev is ﬁrm leverage,
AssetsSize is the logarithm of total assets, LargeHold is the percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, Dual is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the chairman and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise, Mshare is the percentage of management’s shareholding, and
Rinde is the ratio of independent directors on the board. Regression (1) does not include Market, regression (2) includes Market,
regression (3) is the OLS regression using the sensitive sample and regression (4) uses the non-sensitive sample.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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time to obtain some government gain. Xue and Bai (2008) ﬁnd that SOEs in regions with high unemployment
retain more surplus employees. As compensation, the government awards them ﬁnancial subsidies. Accord-
ingly, we test for another possible preferential policy, the tax rate, which we deﬁne as follows.The tax rate ¼ initial taxesþ taxes closing taxes Definition ð1Þ
The tax rate ¼ current taxes Definition ð2ÞWe employ these two deﬁnitions because taxes assessed on an accrual basis and realization basis result in
diﬀerent tax rates and actual taxes can diﬀer greatly from accrued taxes. After standardizing the two tax rate
calculations by revenue, we perform regression analysis on the size of an enterprise’s redundant workforce.
The results are presented in Table 13 and show that the tax rate levied on SOEs is signiﬁcantly negatively
related to the number of redundant employees it retains. These ﬁndings constitute evidence that although
SOEs are forced to shoulder a government policy burden, they are rewarded for doing so with preferential
policies, such as a lower tax rate.Table 13
Regression of policy burden and its beneﬁts.
Deﬁnition (1) Deﬁnition (2)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
EL 0.010 0.024*** 0.002** 0.002***
(1.261) (2.709) (2.392) (2.653)
Layoﬀ 0.012 0.001
(0.754) (0.322)
Nature 0.021 0.011***
(0.624) (3.068)
AssetsSize 0.020 0.000
(1.281) (0.137)
FixedAssets 0.074 0.017*
(0.804) (1.773)
ROA 0.232 0.017
(1.217) (0.857)
Lev 0.145 0.057***
(1.589) (5.896)
LargeHold 0.054 0.010
(0.496) (0.873)
Dual 0.029 0.004
(0.622) (0.776)
Mshare 0.766 0.001
(0.402) (0.00413)
Rinde 0.393* 0.046*
(1.679) (1.867)
Constant 0.068*** 0.311 0.082*** 0.117***
(4.600) (0.911) (50.81) (3.247)
Controlled
Observations 7594 7594 7594 7594
R-squared 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.079
Notes: The dependent variable is the eﬀective tax rate. EL is overemployment, Layoﬀ is
the regional unemployment rate, Nature is the ﬁrm’s position in the political hierarchy,
AssetsSize is the logarithm of total assets, FixedAssets is the size of ﬁxed assets, ROA is
return on assets, Lev is leverage, LargeHold is the percentage of the largest share-
holder’s shareholding, Dual is a dummy that equals 1 if the chairman and CEO are the
same person, and 0 otherwise, Mshare is the percentage of management’s shareholding
and Rinde is the ratio of independent directors on the board.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
20 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–266.4. Robustness tests
Hypothesis 1 posits that overemployment leads to a decrease in PPS. However, a surplus workforce and
PPS are likely to display an endogenous relationship, that is, SOEs with certain company characteristics (such
as greater government intervention in their aﬀairs) take on more political responsibilities. Hence, these enter-
prises retain redundant staﬀ and proﬁtability is not a key performance indicator by which to measure execu-
tive eﬀort, thereby leading to weak PPS. However, in the test of Hypothesis 1, the control variables are those
that aﬀect executive pay, not PPS, which may introduce the possibility of endogeneity. To investigate the
impact of surplus employees on PPS and the possible endogeneity between them, we add a conservatism test,
which adopts the dummy variable for PPS from Abowd (1990) as the dependent variable and overemployment
as the main study variable. After consulting the studies carried out by Firth et al. (2006) and Kato and Chery
(2004) on the pay of Chinese executives, we also control for the state-owned equity ratio, ﬁrm size, the pro-
portion of independent directors and the debt ratio to determine how they aﬀect the sensitivity of the executive
compensation variable. After controlling for these variables, if overemployment still has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the coeﬃcient regression of the sensitivity variable, then we consider endogeneity not to be a concern and the
overemployment variable to be one of the key factors aﬀecting PPS. The regression results are presented in
Table 14.
Regressions (2) and (3) in Table 14 show that after controlling for the aforementioned variables, overem-
ployment is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the dummy variable for PPS, which shows that the existence of
redundant staﬀ decreases PPS.
ROA is used as the performance index for the tests of Hypothesis 1 and proﬁts in this index include unsus-
tainable proﬁts. To overcome the inﬂuence of unsustainable proﬁts on our conclusions, we also use OROA
and OROE as the performance index in this test, but the empirical results are largely the same. In addition
to replacing the main index, we also carry out a conservatism test on our calculations using a heteroskedas-
ticity-robust inference and year cluster analysis, and the empirical results remain robustness.Table 14
Logistic regression according to Abowd (1990).
Variable (1) (2) (3)
EL 0.001 0.003** 0.006**
(1.125) (2.121) (2.181)
State 0.096 0.025
(0.835) (0.194)
Nature 0.127** 0.130**
(2.182) (2.117)
AssetsSize 0.063** 0.072***
(2.522) (2.607)
Lev 0.162 0.022
(1.119) (0.141)
Dual 0.116 0.105
(1.347) (1.196)
Rinde 0.861*** 0.815*
(3.292) (1.755)
Constant 0.374*** 1.133** 1.462**
(13.98) (2.108) (2.421)
Year, Ind Controlled
Observations 6533 6533 6533
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Notes: The dependent variable, Senti, is a dummy variable for PPS. EL is overemployment,
Nature is the ﬁrm’s position in the political hierarchy, AssetsSize is the logarithm of total assets,
Lev is the ﬁrm leverage ratio, Dual is a dummy that equals 1 if the chairman and CEO are the
same person, and 0 otherwise, and Rinde is the ratio of independent directors on the board.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 15
Robustness test of H2.
Variable Robust Cluster (year)
Lagel 0.237*** 0.237***
(3.656) (5.331)
Senti 0.197 0.197
(1.587) (1.563)
Senti_Lagel 0.099* 0.099*
(1.795) (1.801)
Market 0.031 0.031
(0.370) (0.439)
Num 0.486*** 0.486***
(6.027) (4.182)
Layoﬀ 0.019 0.019
(0.207) (0.216)
Pegdp 0.104** 0.104
(2.501) (1.350)
Lev 0.257 0.257
(0.714) (0.653)
AssetsSize 0.017 0.017
(0.205) (0.140)
LargeHold 0.009 0.009
(1.121) (1.075)
Dual 0.008 0.008
(0.0535) (0.0558)
Mshare 17.270 17.270
(0.815) (0.785)
Rinde 1.591 1.591
(1.373) (1.269)
Constant 2.818 2.818
(1.791) (1.309)
Year, Ind Controlled
Observations 6533 6533
R-squared 0.016 0.016
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in employment, Pnum. The independent variables
are the lag of overemployment, Lagel. Senti is the sensitivity index for pay for performance,
Senti_Lagel is the interaction of Senti and Lagel, Market is the marketization index according to
Fan and Wang (2010), Layoﬀ is the regional unemployment rate, Pegdp is regional per capita
GDP, Lev is ﬁrm leverage, AssetsSize is the logarithm of total assets, LargeHold is the per-
centage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, Dual is a dummy that equals 1 if the chairman
and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise, Mshare is the percentage of management’s
shareholding and Rinde is the ratio of independent directors on the board.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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robust inference and year cluster regression analysis show that the interaction term, Senti_LagEL, which was
not previously signiﬁcant, becomes signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level and remains signiﬁcant in the sub-sample regres-
sion. Similar methods are employed to test H2(b) and the regression results remain largely unchanged. All of
these results are presented in Table 15, from which it can be seen that these tests conﬁrm the relative robust-
ness of our empirical results.7. Conclusion
Drawing on a sample of SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the 1999–2009
period, this study is the ﬁrst to research the inﬂuence of overemployment on PPS. Our ﬁndings show the exis-
22 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26tence of a surplus workforce signiﬁcantly weakens PPS and the eﬃcacy of accounting measures in assessing per-
formance. A further ﬁnding is that the greater the PPS, the greater management’s motivation to lay oﬀ redun-
dant staﬀ and reduce future growth in employee numbers to maximize its own interests. Further, the lower the
degree of government intervention, the greater the control management has over future employee growth.
This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of executive incentives against the institutional
background of SOEs in China. Although previous research has considered the inﬂuence of government inter-
vention on the PPS of top managers, here government intervention is measured by SOE overemployment,
which is shown to aﬀect executive PPS. This study thus extends the literature by considering the economic con-
sequences of PPS. We also identify a type of gambling between executives and the government. In pursuit of
personal interest maximization, management gambles with the government according to its level of PPS, laying
oﬀ a certain number of redundant employees, which reacts with the PPS factors. This ﬁnding constitutes one of
the main diﬀerences between this research on the impact of PPS and similar research carried out abroad.
The study also has several limitations. First, the size of the redundant workforce in this paper is measured
following Xue’s (2008) method and thus does not take into account other indices for measuring overemploy-
ment. Our calculations may thus fail to reﬂect reality. We assume that private enterprises shoulder no policy
burden and thus employ them to estimate employee numbers in similar enterprises in the state sector. It is pos-
sible that systematic diﬀerences between the two types of enterprises may have biased our estimation of
overemployment.
Second, although monetary rewards are the primary means of motivating executives, our sole use of such
rewards may have an impact on our research conclusions. In the special system that prevails in China, exec-
utive compensation is controlled to a certain extent and other motivation modes such as on-the-job consump-
tion and opportunities for political promotion may take the place of monetary rewards in certain instances
(Chen, 2005). The existence of such motivating factors may serve to weaken the eﬀect of monetary incentives.
Furthermore, the index of executive pay used in this paper is based on the top three disclosures by listed com-
panies and the exclusion of non-listed personnel may aﬀect our conclusions.
Finally, we employ the degree of marketization index in Fan and Wang (2010) as the measurement index
for government intervention. Although the degree of regional marketization may reﬂect relations between the
local government and the market to a certain extent, this index is based on provincial data. Applying this data
to reﬂect government intervention at the ﬁrm level inevitably introduces noise that is likely to aﬀect the con-
clusions of this study.
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Appendix A
Test of Abowd’s (1990) PPS dummy variable.
PPS is an important variable in this study. Here, we explain our use of the variable in greater depth, taking
Abowd’s (1990) deﬁnition as our example.
1. Deﬁnition reliability. Abowd’s variable is an important indicator of PPS. We test his method of arriving at
it and the results are presented in Table A.1. It can be seen that the interaction variable is signiﬁcant, which
indicates that Abowd’s deﬁnition largely reﬂects whether or not salary is sensitive to performance.
2. Endogeneity. If the empirical results support Hypothesis 1 in that currently employed redundant personnel
inﬂuence current compensation-performance sensitivity, then we consider current PPS to be part of an enter-
prise’s current policy burden.What we wish to analyze further is whether overemployment-inﬂuenced current
PPS has any eﬀect on the size of an enterprise’s workforce in the future. The current endogenous variable
possesses a certain degree of exogeneity relative to the future variable and its endogeneity contrasts with
D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 1–26 23the variables for the current or prior period. Similar to Abowd (1990), we employ the PPS variable to deter-
mine whether the current exogenous salary reacts sensitively to performance as a way of explaining future
improvements in enterprise performance to which incentivizing executives in the current period is exogenous.
3. Dynamic characteristics of sensitivity. Determining whether enterprises exhibit stable PPS characteristics is
an important issue in this study. The main evidence for PPS sensitivity is whether current salary changes
with current performance. Searching for this evidence requires large-sample regression analysis. We can
determine what kind of corporation exhibits greater sensitivity between salary and performance, or we
can draw conclusions about which factors inﬂuence compensation-performance sensitivity. In other words,
we take the law as a whole, and the law is whether salaries in the sample corporations are sensitive to per-
formance changes. This concept is similar to accounting conservatism. We adopt Basu’s (1997) model to
analyze the overall conservatism of the sample enterprises in the earliest period. However, Khan and Watts
(2009) design a ﬁrm-year accounting conservatism measure, which demonstrates how corporate conserva-
tism has changed. All of these methods provide indirect support for our Hypothesis.
As we can see from Table A.1, from regression (1) to regression (4), the interaction variable of the dummy
variable Senti and ROA is signiﬁcant, which indicates that the dummy variable for PPS measured by Abowd’s
(1990) method is largely able to describe the sensitivity of payment to performance.Table A.1
Results of tests on Abowd’s (1990) method.
Variable name Variable symbol Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4)
Firm performance ROA 0.831*** 0.448** 0.448** 0.448**
(3.012) (2.167) (1.966) (2.786)
Sensitivity Senti 0.047* 0.009 0.009 0.009
(1.947) (0.516) (0.367) (0.285)
Cross item Senti_ROA 2.613*** 2.128*** 2.128*** 2.128**
(8.049) (9.148) (3.011) (2.837)
Per capita GDP Pegdp 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(17.00) (19.15) (9.859)
Leverage Lev 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.306) (0.162) (0.140)
Firm size AssetsSize 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259***
(27.91) (18.90) (21.05)
Proportion of largest shareholders LargeHold 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(11.06) (10.99) (15.06)
CEO and chairman Dual 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.463) (0.425) (0.450)
Managerial ownership Mshare 4.656*** 4.656*** 4.656***
(4.192) (6.557) (5.784)
Ratio of independent directors Rinde 0.287** 0.287* 0.287**
(1.968) (1.867) (2.569)
Constant Constant 13.073*** 6.524*** 6.524*** 6.524***
(694.2) (34.13) (25.51) (27.71)
Year Industry Year, Ind Controlled
Observations 6533 6533 6533 6533
R-squared 0.063 0.528 0.528 0.528
Notes: This table presents the regression results of the checks on Abowd’s (1990) method. The dependent variable is executive com-
pensation. The independent variables are (ROA) ﬁrm performance, Senti is a dummy variable for PPS, Senti_ROA is the cross-item of
Senti and ROA, Pedgp is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP, Lev is the leverage ratio of a ﬁrm, Assetsize is the natural logarithm of
total assets, Largehold is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder, Dual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO and
chairman of the board are the same person, and 0 otherwise, Mshare is managerial ownership, and Rinde is the ratio of independent
directors on the board. Regression (1) is the OLS regression without controlling for the other variables, regression (2) controls for the
other variables, regression (3) includes a heteroskedasticity-robust inference and regression (4) is clustered by year.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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To test the reliability of our overemployment estimate and the theoretical inﬂuence of the degree of mark-
etization on the size of the redundant workforce, we test the relationship between the two.
In regions with a high degree of marketization, governments aﬀord enterprises a relatively high degree of
control for several reasons. The local governments in these regions tend to be more open-minded, better able
to use market tools skillfully and to have more market mechanisms at their disposal. In addition, there is gen-
erally greater market competition in these regions. These regional conditions compel local governments to
exhibit behavior that is closer to market requirements if they are to survive and develop in the face of com-
petition (Chen, 2009). In regions with a lower degree of marketization, in contrast, local protectionism and
government intervention are stronger and these regions still carry elements of the planned economy (Fan
and Wang, 2010). SOEs in these regions are thus more likely to experience government intervention and,
accordingly, to take on more social responsibilities, such as supporting employment. It is for these reasons
that we test the relationship between the degree of marketization and overemployment.Table A.2
OLS regression of overemployment on market development.
Variable name Variable symbol Regression (1) Regression (2)
Market development Market 0.114*** 0.037**
(9.793) (2.333)
Unemployment rate Layoﬀ 0.067***
(3.101)
Political ranks of ﬁrms Nature 0.193***
(4.382)
Firm size AssetsSize 0.038*
(1.807)
Fixed assets FixedAssets 0.722***
(6.032)
Firm performance ROA 0.804***
(3.252)
Leverage Lev 0.620***
(5.243)
Ownership concentration LargeHold 0.346**
(2.434)
CEO and chairman Dual 0.045
(0.739)
Managerial ownership Mshare 0.389
(0.157)
Ratio of independent directors Rinde 0.169
(0.556)
Constant Constant 1.559*** 0.181
(15.89) (0.404)
Year-Industry Year, Ind Controlled
Observations 7594 7594
R-squared 0.012 0.121
Notes: This table presents the results of the test of the association between government intervention and overemployment. The dependent
variable is overemployment (EL). The independent variables are Market, which is the development of the local market as a proxy for
government intervention; Layoﬀ, which is the local unemployment rate; Nature, which is the political rank of a ﬁrm; AssetsSize, which is
the natural logarithm of total assets; Fixedassets, which is the size of ﬁxed assets; ROA, which stands for ﬁrm performance; Lev, which
stands for the ﬁrm leverage ratio; LargeHold, which stands for ownership concentration measured by the proportion of shares held by the
largest shareholder; Dual, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO and chairman of the board are the same person, and 0
otherwise; Mshare, which is the degree of managerial ownership; and Rinde, which is the ratio of independent directors on the board.
Regression (1) is an OLS regression without controls for the other variables and regression (2) includes such controls.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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ables for testing the degree of marketization are based primarily on the domestic literature discussing policy
objectives, excess employees and government intervention in SOEs, we adopt the following model for our test,
with the results presented in Table A.2.EL ¼ a1 þ a2 Marketþ a3 Layoff þ a4 Natureþ a5 Pegdpþ a6 AssetsSizeþ a7 FixedAssetsþ a8 ROA
þ a9 Levþ a10 H5þ a11 Dualþ a12 Mshareþ a10 Rindeþ a11
X
Yearþ a12
X
Indþ eIt can be seen from this table that regardless of whether we perform single- or multiple-variable regression,
the degree of marketization (Market) and the scale of overemployment (EL) are negatively related at the 1%
level of signiﬁcance, which indicates that the higher the degree of marketization, the smaller the size of the
redundant workforce. The degree of marketization is a variable that embodies the degree of government inter-
vention. Hence, less government intervention allows SOEs to reduce their multiple objectives and policy tasks
such as employment promotion and unemployment reduction. Consequently, the extent of overemployment is
reduced.
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